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ABSTRACT:  At approximately the same time that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased the costs 
associated with being a public company, important Delaware case law created a difference in the 
standard of judicial review for the two basic methods of freezing out minority shareholders.  
While a freeze-out executed as a statutory merger is subject to stringent “entire fairness” review, 
the Delaware Chancery Court held in In re Siliconix Shareholders’ Litigation that a freeze-out 
executed as a tender offer is not.  This paper presents the first systematic empirical evidence on 
post-Siliconix freeze-outs.  Using a new database of all freeze-outs executed during the current 
doctrinal regime, I find that a controlling shareholder pays less to the minority shareholders, on 
average, when it uses a tender offer compared to a merger.  This difference between tender offers 
and mergers seems to increase with the size of the controller’s pre-deal stake.  These findings 
introduce a puzzle as to why more than two-thirds of post-Siliconix freeze-outs still proceed 
through the traditional merger route.  I present some evidence that controllers are more likely to 
choose a merger when they hold a relatively small controlling stake, in order to avoid 
supermajority approval from the minority that would be required in a tender offer.  I also present 
some evidence that a freeze-out is more likely to be executed as a tender offer when the 
controller’s outside counsel has substantial M&A experience.  These findings bolster arguments 
for convergence in judicial standards of review between tender offer and merger freeze-outs, and 
provide guidance on how such convergence might best be achieved. 
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Due at least in part to the general decline of the stock market since 2000, as well as the 
increased cost associated with being a public company under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
freeze-outs have been on the rise.  Between January 2000 and December 2003, 38 controlling 
shareholders per year, on average, have frozen out their minority shareholders, nearly three times 
the rate reported by Coates (1999) for the period 1985-1996.  At approximately the same time 
that freeze-out activity began increasing, important Delaware case law created a difference in the 
standard of judicial review for the two basic methods of freezing out minority shareholders.  
While a freeze-out executed as a statutory merger is subject to stringent “entire fairness” review, 
the Delaware Chancery Court held in In re Siliconix Shareholders’ Litigation that a freeze-out 
executed as a tender offer is not.  Academic commentators and practitioners have debated 
whether and to what extent this difference has created meaningful differences in practice, and if 
so, how judges and policymakers should respond. 
This paper presents the first systematic empirical evidence on post-Siliconix  freeze-outs.  
Using a new database of all non-short-form freeze-outs that were announced in the current 
doctrinal regime (n=96), I find that a controlling shareholder pays less to the minority 
shareholders, on average, when it uses a tender offer rather than a merger.  This difference 
between tender offers and mergers seems to increase with the size of the controller’s pre-deal 
stake.  These findings introduce a puzzle as to why more than two-thirds of post-Siliconix freeze-
outs still proceed through the traditional merger route.  I present some evidence that controllers 
are more likely to choose a merger when they hold a relatively small controlling stake, in order 
to avoid supermajority approval from the minority that would be required in a tender offer.  I 
also present some evidence that the identity of the controller’s outside legal counsel influences 
the choice of transactional form.  Specifically, when the controller’s outside counsel has 
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These findings bolster arguments for convergence in judicial standards of review between tender 
offer and merger freeze-outs, and provide guidance on how such convergence might best be 
achieved. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Part 2 provides background on freeze-out 
mechanics, describes the recent developments in the Delaware case law on freeze-outs, and 
summarizes the academic and practitioner literature commenting on these developments.  Part 3 
develops a theory of freeze-outs that yields four testable hypotheses.  Part 4 tests these 
hypotheses against a new database of post-Siliconix freeze-outs.  Part 5 discusses potential policy 
implications of these findings.  Part 6 concludes. 
2. Background 
A freeze-out (also known, with some occasional loss of precision, as a “going private 
merger,” a “squeeze-out,” a “parent-subsidiary merger,” a “minority buyout,” or a “cash-out 
merger”) is a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the minority shareholders 
for cash or the controller’s stock.  The traditional route for executing a freeze-out uses the 
process outlined by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP
1 and Kahn v. Lynch 
Communication Systems:
2 the target board establishes a special committee (SC) of directors who 
are independent from the controller; the SC hires bankers and lawyers to advise it; and the SC 
negotiates with the controller over the terms of the deal, most importantly the price to be paid to 
the minority shareholders and whether the deal will include a non-waivable majority-of-the-
minority (MOM) closing condition.  If the controller and the SC reach agreement, the deal is 
submitted for the necessary board and shareholder approvals.   If approved, the transaction is 
typically executed as a statutory merger or a two-step tender offer (that is, a first-step tender 
offer followed by a short-form merger), though occasionally it is structured as a reverse stock 
split or an asset acquisition by the controlling shareholder. 
An alternative to the traditional route is a tender offer directly to minority shareholders.  In 
this route, the controller announces the tender offer and seeks to get to 90% voting control.  
                                                 
1 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983). 
2 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
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transaction, negotiate with the controller, and issue a 14D-9 recommendation to minority 
shareholders (approve, reject, neutral, or unable to take a position).  If the controller gets to 90% 
voting control, it then typically executes a short-form merger, which does not require a 
shareholder vote, in order to eliminate the remaining (non-tendering) minority shareholders.   
Because 90% is the critical threshold, the controller often conditions its tender offer on getting to 
90% control (a “90% condition”). 
2.1. Recent judicial developments 
Freeze-outs are generally subject to “entire fairness” review by the Delaware courts, a 
stringent standard of review, because of their self-dealing nature (self-dealing because the 
controller is the buyer and typically dominates the seller’s board).  Even procedural protections 
such as the use of a special committee or a MOM condition only serve to shift the burden of 
proof on entire fairness to the plaintiff.
3 In June 2001, however, the Delaware Chancery Court 
held in In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation
4 that entire fairness review does not apply to 
tender offer freeze-outs, “unless actual coercion or disclosure violations are shown,” because the 
Delaware corporate code does not provide a statutory role for the target board in such an offer.  
Just one month after Siliconix, the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration 
Corp.
5 held that a short-form merger is also not subject to entire fairness review.  Taken together, 
Siliconix  and  Glassman  allow a controlling shareholder to avoid entire fairness review by 
executing its freeze-out as a tender offer followed by a short-form merger.
6  The result is that the 
Delaware courts now afford different standards of judicial scrutiny to transactional forms that 
achieve the same result in practice, namely, the elimination of the minority shareholders. 
                                                 
3 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
4 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
5 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). 
6 See, e.g., Next Level Communications Scheduled 14D-9 (filed Jan. 23, 2003) (“Q: Why would Motorola launch an 
unsolicited tender offer, as opposed to discussing the matter and negotiating with Next Level’s Board of Directors?  
A: By making a tender offer directly to stockholders, Motorola is attempting to avoid having to negotiate with Next 
Level’s Independent Directors, who have a fiduciary responsibility to protect you. . . . Under Delaware case law, if 
Motorola were to negotiate a transaction agreement with the Independent Directors, Motorla would have a legal duty 
to deal ‘fairly’ with the minority stockholders and to pay a ‘fair price’ for your shares.  Through the unsolicited 
tender offer, Motorola is trying to avoid its legal duty to pay you a fair price for your shares in any negotiated 
transaction and to treat you fairly as minority stockholders.”).   
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Pure Resources held that a tender offer is not coercive, and therefore the Siliconix safe harbor 
applies, only if the offer is subject to a non-waivable majority of the minority tender condition; 
the controller guarantees to consummate a prompt §253 short-form merger at the same price if it 
obtains more than 90% of the shares; and the controller makes no “retributive threats” in its 
negotiations with the special committee.
7  The court confirmed, however, that if these conditions 
are met a freeze-out tender offer is not subject to entire fairness review. 
2.2. Academic and practitioner commentary 
Conventional wisdom among practitioners suggested that these doctrinal developments 
would have a significant impact on freeze-out transactional form and outcomes.  According to 
the  Wall Street Journal, “A couple of major court decisions handed down last year . . . 
essentially permit those big holders to buy the minority investors out on the cheap.”
8  And the 
Corporate Control Alert stated: “The current thinking on minority buyouts, many lawyers say, 
boils down to two words: tender offer.”
9  Academic commentators have divided on how judges 
and policymakers should respond.  At one end of the spectrum, Cannon (2003) and Resnick 
(2003) argue for doctrinal convergence through entire fairness review for tender offer freeze-
outs.  Gilson & Gordon (2003) propose a middle-ground approach that eliminates entire fairness 
review if the controller has complied with the procedural protections identified in Pure 
Resources and the SC has veto power over the transaction, but imposes entire fairness review if 
the controller goes directly to shareholders through a tender offer without gaining SC approval 
first. Aronstam, Balotti & Rehbock (2003) similarly propose a hybrid approach, urging a 
“limited fairness hearing” for freeze-out tender offers, or an amendment to the Delaware 
appraisal statute to require the controller to pay all minority shareholders the appraised valued of 
their shares. 
At the other end of the spectrum, some commentators defend the Siliconix/Glassman 
doctrinal contour.  Pritchard (2004) argues that the gap in standards of review represents a one-
                                                 
7 In re Pure Resources Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
8 Robin Sidel, Takeover Targets Force Up Offers in ‘Minority Squeeze-Out’ Deals, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2002) at 
C3. 
9 David Marcus, Cleaning Up Your Corporate Structure, CORPORATE CONTROL ALERT, at 20 (July 2003). 
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lower prices that investors will pay for a minority stake. Pritchard (2004) and Abramczyk, 
Cincilla & Honaker (2003) argue that minority shareholders have adequate protections against 
coercive tender offers even in the absence of entire fairness review.  To support this view, some 
commentators point to the fact that target boards generally establish a special committee to 
negotiate with the controller even if the controller proceeds via tender offer.  As illustrations, 
practitioners point to Intimate Brands’ negotiation with its controlling shareholder Limited; TD 
Waterhouse’s negotiation with its controller Toronto-Dominion Bank; and Prodigy 
Communications’ negotiation with its controller SBC Communications.  All three of these deals 
were post-Siliconix freeze-outs executed through a tender offer.  In all three transactions, the 
target established a special committee of independent directors to negotiate with the controller.  
And in all three, the special committee was able to negotiate a substantial increase over the 
controller’s initial offer.  This anecdotal evidence suggests that a special committee might have 
as much bargaining power against the controlling shareholder in a freeze-out tender offer as it 
does in a freeze-out merger. 
The debate on the implications of the Siliconix/Glassman  mechanism for freezing out 
minority shareholders has been hindered by the absence of any systematic empirical evidence.  
Basic questions remain unanswered: What fraction of freeze-outs are executed as mergers versus 
tender offers?  If both transactional forms continue after Siliconix, how do controllers decide 
which to use?  Are outcomes different by transactional form?  In the next Part I formalize my 
approach to these questions by developing a theory of freeze-outs that yields specific predictions 
and testable hypotheses.  In Part 4 I test these hypotheses against a new database of all post-
Siliconix freeze-outs. 
3. A theory of freeze-outs 
In this Part I develop a theory of freeze-outs that introduces three factors: the special 
committee’s bargaining power; the shareholder approval requirement; and lawyer effects.  I 
discuss each of these in turn. 
  5
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All else equal, the SC may have more bargaining power against a controlling shareholder in a 
merger freeze-out than in a tender offer freeze-out for three reasons.  The first reason is the 
difference in the standard of judicial review.  Entire fairness review for freeze-out mergers may 
increase price ex post through a judicially-mandated payout to the minority, or ex ante due to the 
“shadow” of a judicially mandated-payout (cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser 1979), or both.  The 
second reason is the time available for negotiations.  Merger freeze-out negotiations can last 
indefinitely, in theory, and typically last two to three months, while tender offer freeze-out 
negotiations are limited by the fact that the SC must issue its 14D-9 recommendation to minority 
shareholders within 10 days of the initiation of the tender offer.
10   In a merger, therefore, the SC 
may have more time to assess the transaction, seek out other potential bidders,
11 and make 
counter-offers, all of which may increase its overall bargaining power against the controller.  The 
third reason, related to the second, is the SC’s ability to veto the transaction.
12  While a merger, 
for all practical purposes, cannot proceed without SC approval, a tender offer freeze-out does not 
require SC approval and, in fact, is often initiated by the controller even before the SC is formed. 
Differences in bargaining power should create differences in outcomes.  As described by a 
senior partner at a major New York City law firm: 
You can debate whether you do better economically in Siliconix.  I happen to 
think you do.  Because I think what you’re doing in Siliconix is negotiating with 
the market, you’re not negotiating with the special committee, in the sense that as 
long as your price will clear enough of the market to get to 90%, you win.  And 
                                                 
10 This timing pressure is mitigated somewhat by the fact that a SC can issue a 14D-9 with no recommendation, 
stating that it has had insufficient time to assess the transaction, and then amend later once it has had time to do so.  
However, this ability to delay against a tender offer freeze-out is limited by the fact that the controller’s tender offer 
only needs to stay open for 20 business days under the Williams Act. 
11 Although most controlling shareholders make clear their unwillingness to sell to other bidders, and a shareholder 
cannot be compelled to sell its stock, see Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994), some controlling 
shareholders are willing to sell to a higher bidder, typically with the payment of a breakup fee.  See, e.g., 
Westerbeke Corp. Press Release (May 5, 2003) (“Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Westerbeke is free 
to seek and consider other acquisition proposals for the sale or merger of Westerbeke through June 12, 2003. . . . In 
the event that the merger agreement is terminated to accept a third party proposal or under certain other 
circumstances, Westerbeke has agreed to pay expenses of up to $75,000 to Mr. Westerbeke.”). 
12 See, e.g., WFS Financial Press Release (Sept. 26, 2002) (“WFS Financial announced today that it had received 
notice from Westcorp that the proposal to acquire the outstanding 16% minority interest of WFS has been 
withdrawn. . . .  In its notice, Westcorp indicated that it had withdrawn that proposal and was terminating further 
discussions with the independent director special committee of WFS because the two special committees were 
unable to reach an agreement on a mutually acceptable exchange ratio for the proposed transaction.”).  
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the same discipline.  . . . If you were to ask me, from a practical point of view, is 
there a difference in the leverage, the answer is vast.  If this is a traditional 
negotiated transaction, the special committee has a lot more leverage.
13 
A partner at another major New York City law firm similarly states:  
By going through the special committee [i.e., merger] process, you are voluntarily 
giving a lot of leverage to the target company. . . . The significant tactical 
difference is that the special committee in a tender offer has ten business days to 
work its magic, to come out with its recommendation.  That makes the negotiation 
process far more truncated.  They are forced to make their recommendation, 
frankly, on less information. . . In addition, the special committee has no ultimate 
authority.  It makes an important recommendation, but it has no ultimate 
authority.
14 
The testable hypotheses, then, can be stated as follows: 
H1: Controlling shareholders pay more in statutory merger freeze-outs than in 
tender offer freeze-outs. 
 
3.2. Shareholder approval requirement 
A second factor that might influence the price paid to minority shareholders is the approval 
required from minority shareholders.  In assessing the costs and benefits of the Siliconix 
mechanism versus the traditional merger route, academic commentators to date have not noted 
important differences in the minority approval required across transactional forms.  Specifically, 
the level of minority shareholder approval is determined by which of three transaction structures 
is used: a merger freeze-out without a majority-of-the-minority (MOM) condition; a merger 
freeze-out with a MOM condition; or a tender offer freeze-out.  In this Part I examine each of 
these in turn. 
First, a merger freeze-out without a MOM condition requires little or no approval from the 
minority.  If the controller holds more than 50%, it can unilaterally approve the transaction by 
                                                 
13 Telephone Interview with Practitioner A (Feb. 20, 2004). 
14 Telephone Interview with Practitioner B (Mar. 4, 2004). 
  7
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art17voting its shares in favor of the merger.
15  If the controller holds less than 50%, it needs minimal 
approval from the minority.  For example, a 40% controlling shareholder would require an 
additional 10% of shares outstanding, or 17% of the minority (10% out of the remaining 60%) in 
order to approve the transaction.
16 
Second, a merger freeze-out with a non-waivable MOM condition, as urged by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Weinberger and Kahn v. Lynch, requires 51% of the minority shareholders to 
approve the transaction, regardless of the controller’s pre-deal stake.
17  For example, if the 
controller holds 40% initially, 51% of the minority, or 31% of the total outstanding shares, must 
support the freeze-out.  If the controller holds 80% initially, again 51% of the minority, which 
this time amounts to 11% of the total outstanding shares, must support the transaction. 
Finally, the level of minority shareholder support required in a tender offer freeze-out is 
inversely correlated with the controller’s pre-deal stake, because the controller must get to 90% 
voting control in order to then execute a short-form merger.  For example, if the controller holds 
40%, it needs another 50% of shares outstanding, or 83% of the minority shares outstanding 
(50% out of the 60% of total shares held by the minority) in order to achieve the 90% voting 
control that allows it to execute a short-form merger.  If instead the controller already holds 85%, 
then it only needs another 5% of shares outstanding, or 33% of the minority shares (5% out of 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Balanced Care Schedule 14A (July 19, 2002) (“For the merger to occur, the merger agreement must be 
adopted and the transactions it contemplates, including the merger, approved by the holders of a majority of the 
outstanding shares entitled to vote on the merger. IPC owns approximately 53% of our outstanding common stock. 
IPC has informed us that it intends to vote in favor of adoption of the merger agreement and approval of the 
transactions its contemplates, including the merger, and you should therefore expect that each of these will be 
approved at the special meeting regardless of the votes of any other stockholders.”). 
16  See, e.g., Storage USA 8-K (Nov. 5, 2001) (“As of the record date, Security Capital beneficially owned 
11,765,654 shares, or approximately 41.3% of our common stock.  Security Capital has informed us that it intends to 
vote its Storage USA shares in favor of the purchase agreement and the Transactions.  Storage USA’s directors and 
executive officers own approximately 2.3% of our common stock and to our knowledge they intend to vote their 
Storage USA shares in favor of the purchase agreement and the Transactions.  Accordingly, the affirmative vote of 
holders of an additional 1,815,973 shares, which equals approximately an additional 6.4% of our outstanding shares 
of common stock, will be sufficient to approve the purchase agreement and the Transactions.”).  
17 See, e.g., Oriole Homes Corp. 8-K (filed Sept. 11, 2002) (“The combined voting power of the Levy Group and the 
Loeb Group is sufficient to satisfy the statutory approval requirement.  In addition to the statutory approval 
requirement, the Merger Agreement provides that it is a non-waivable condition to our obligation to consummate the 
Merger that the Merger Agreement and the Merger are approved by a majority of the shares of Class A Common 
Stock and Class B Common Stock not beneficially owned by the Levy Group, voting together as a single class, that 
are cast in favor of or against approval of the Merger Agreement and the Merger at the Annual Meeting.”). 
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18   In general, the controlling shareholder in a 
tender offer freeze-out must obtain (90-k) percent of the total shares outstanding, or (90-k)/(100-
k) percent of the minority shares outstanding, where k is the controller’s pre-deal stake. 
If minority shareholders’ reservation prices for their shares are normally distributed, then the 
supply curve for minority shares is upward sloping.  The controller cannot price discriminate 
against this supply curve because all shareholders of the same class must receive the same 
consideration in a merger, and SEC Rule 14d-10 requires the controller to pay the same price to 
all shareholders who sell into a single tender offer.  This analysis yields the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: The price paid to minority shareholders increases as the required level of 
minority support increases. 
Between Hypotheses H1 and H2, it cannot be resolved at the level of theory as to whether SC 
bargaining power or the minority approval requirement is the binding constraint.  The answer 
may depend on the transactional form used: for example, if the difference between tender offers 
and mergers is sufficiently large, then the level of minority approval required may be the binding 
constraint in a tender offer but not in a merger.  Put more simply, the critical hurdle for the 
controlling shareholder may be the special committee in a merger freeze-out, and minority 
approval in a tender offer freeze-out.  This possibility suggests a potential interaction between 
Hypotheses H1 and H2, which I test empirically in the next Part. 
Finally, while Hypothesis H1 and H2 take transactional form to be exogenous, the analysis in 
this Part suggests that transactional form may in part be a function of the controller’s pre-deal 
stake.  Specifically, the approval required from minority shareholders in a tender offer freeze-out 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
18 Of course, a MOM condition would set a 50% floor on the minority approval needed in a tender offer freeze-out.  
See, e.g., TD Waterhouse Group 14D-9 (Oct. 11, 2001) (“The Special Committee noted that because of the Majority 
of the Minority Condition, the Revised Offer cannot succeed unless a majority of the publicly-owned Shares are 
tendered.  Absent that condition, due to TD Bank’s ownership of 88% of the Shares, the Purchaser and TD Bank 
would be able to attain ownership of 90% of the Shares even if only 16.6% of the Shares they do not already own 
were tendered in response to the Offer or the Revised Offer.”). 
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stake. 
Hypothesis H3 highlights the importance of jointly testing Hypotheses H1 and H2.  For 
example, if all large controllers proceeded via tender offer and all small controllers proceeded 
via merger (i.e., an extreme form of H3), then we might observe controllers paying less in tender 
offer freeze-outs not because of the SC’s lesser bargaining power (H1), but rather because of the 
lower shareholder approval required in a tender offer relative to a merger freeze-out with a 
MOM condition when the controller is large (H2).  In the next Part I attempt to distinguish these 
two potential effects through the use of multivariate analysis. 
3.3. Lawyer effects 
A third factor is the role of lawyers.  Academic and practitioner commentary to date assume 
that legal counsel will choose the optimal transactional form in freeze-outs, which in turn 
assumes that information costs and lawyer agency costs are small.  Interviews and informal 
conversations with experienced New York City practitioners suggest that these assumptions may 
not be correct.  For example, one senior New York City practitioner quoted above states that: 
All things being equal, which they never are, I would go the Siliconix route nine 
times out of ten.  And I think that’s where most of the sophisticated M&A guys I 
talk to are. . . . But there may be lack of awareness on the part of many lawyers of 
the availability and value of the Siliconix structure. . . . Old habits die slowly.  
People who do this once every four years, don’t keep up with the literature and 
would just as soon do it the old way.  And since it’s not wrong – no Delaware 
lawyer is going to say it’s a bad way to do it – there’s a huge amount of inertia 
here.
19 
A variation on this theme is the possibility that certain lawyers and law firms are less 
confident in recommending cutting-edge legal mechanisms to their clients.  According to the 
other New York City law firm partner quoted above: 
In the current environment, I would say to a controlling stockholder, “it is very 
hard to see any reason to go the special committee route rather than the Pure 
Resources [tender offer] route.”  But I believe there may be lawyers, who, when 
they observe some reluctance on the part of their controlling stockholder clients in 
                                                 
19 Practitioner A Interview. 
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them the benefits of the Pure Resources structure over the special committee 
structure.  I think that certain New York City lawyers are more willing to be 
forceful in their advice to a client.
20 
These practitioner impressions yield the following hypothesis: 
H4: The likelihood of using a tender offer increases when outside counsel has 
substantial M&A experience.  
As above, there may be an interaction between Hypotheses H3 and H4: when the controller 
holds a relatively small stake, outside counsel may be likely to recommend a merger freeze-out, 
regardless of its M&A experience, in order to avoid supermajority approval from the minority.  
Only when the controller’s stake is relatively large, and a tender offer freeze-out becomes more 
viable (H3), might we expect to see experienced law firms recommending tender offers at a 
higher rate than other firms. 
3.4. Summary 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses developed in this Part, with +/- signs indicating the 
directions of the predicted correlations: 



















H4 only true when 
large pre-deal stake
H1/H2 interaction:
H2 only true for 
tender offers
 
                                                 




I now test the hypotheses developed in Part 3 against a new database of all freeze-out 
transactions announced and resolved since Siliconix.  I begin with all transactions coded as 
“Acquisitions of Remaining Interest” in Thomson Financial Corporation’s Mergers & 
Acquisitions database, announced between June 19, 2001, the date of the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s opinion in Siliconix, and December 31, 2003.  Although TFC uses a 50% cutoff to 
distinguish acquisitions of remaining interests from acquisitions of a controlling interest, as a 
matter of Delaware corporate law (as well as real-world practicality) a shareholder with as little 
as a 35% holding can be a controlling shareholder.
21  I therefore supplement TFC’s remaining-
interest category with transactions in which the acquirer held 35-50% when the freeze-out was 
initiated.  I exclude transactions in which the acquirer held 90% or more of the target’s voting 
shares, because such transactions can be executed as short-form mergers that do not require a 
shareholder vote.
22  I also exclude remaining-interest acquisitions that are the second step of a 
third-party tender offer, because the second step is invariably at the same price as the first step 
and the first step was negotiated at arms-length.
23  The final database includes 96 freeze-outs.   
For each transaction, I examine SEC filings by the controller and the target company 
(primarily 8-K, 14D-9, 13E-3, 13D, and 14A filings), news reports, and company press releases 
to collect data on the bargaining process, such as the dates and sequence of offers and counter-
offers, whether a special committee of independent directors was formed to assess the 
transaction, and the terms of the final agreement, if one was reached.  Stock price data for each 
target company are taken from the Center for Research in Securities Pricing (CRSP) database.  
The controller’s outside counsel in each transaction is identified using the contact information 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., In re Cysive Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding a 35% stockholder to 
be a controller). 
22 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §253; RMBCA §11.05. 
23 There is a gray area in distinguishing an arms-length transaction from a freeze-out if there is delay between the 
first and second steps of the transaction.  See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).  As a 
practical matter, most arms-length acquirers today wish to execute the second-step tender offer as quickly as 
possible in order to gain 100% of the anticipated economic benefit, to avoid uncertainty in applying dissenters’ 
appraisal rights, to eliminate potential plaintiffs, to delist from the stock exchange, and to deregister under the 1934 
Act. (Subramanian 2003a)  Perhaps as a result, self-dealing and arms-length transactions were clearly 
distinguishable in my database, with no transactions in this potential gray area. 
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acquirer’s 13D filing.  Because 14D-9 and 14A filings are not required in unsuccessful freeze-
outs, I am unable to identify the controller’s outside counsel in nine freeze-outs. 
I classify each freeze-out as either a statutory merger or a tender offer.   I classify seven 
merger freeze-outs that were executed as two-step tender offers as mergers, because the 
Delaware Chancery Court has held that these transactions are subject to entire fairness review.
24  
Though admittedly a closer call, I also classify two freeze-outs that were executed as reverse 
stock splits as mergers, because the requirement of board action that seems to distinguish 
mergers from tender offers is met, and because the Chancery Court has subjected reverse stock 
splits to fairness review in other (non-freezeout) contexts.
25  The findings reported in this Part 
remain unchanged if I exclude reverse stock splits from the analysis. 
4.2. Summary statistics 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of the transactions in the sample based on the transaction 
form used, the resulting negotiation between the controller and the target, and the outcome of the 
negotiation. 
                                                 
24 Hartley v. Peapod, C.A. No. 19025 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2002). 
25 Applebaum v. Avaya, 805 A.2d 209 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
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At the highest level, Figure 2 shows that 72% of post-Siliconix freeze-outs are still executed 
through mergers, and, conversely, only 28% of deals have taken advantage of the “get-out-of-
jail-free card” (Gilson & Gordon 2003) and “fire sale” (Pritchard 2004) that Siliconix seems to 
provide.  This split represents a substantial increase over the pre-Siliconix era: using the same 
methodology I find that only 9 out of 111 freeze-out transactions (8%) were executed as tender 
offers in the 30 months prior to Siliconix (p<0.001).
26  While some practitioners trace the roots of 
the  Siliconix  decision back to the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Solomon v. Pathe 
Commmunications
27 in 1996 (e.g., Wolfe 2002; Abramczyk, Cincilla & Honaker 2003), the 
sharp increase in tender offer incidence after June 2001 suggests that Siliconix provided a clearer 
articulation of the tender offer route than had existed previously.  This responsiveness to 
Delaware M&A case law is consistent with Coates & Subramanian (2000), which presents 
evidence suggesting that practitioners changed the nature of deal protection devices in response 
                                                 
26 This calculation counts seven tender offer freeze-outs announced by ThermoElectron on a single day (January 31, 
2000) as a single freeze-out.  If these seven transactions are counted separately, the fraction of tender offer freeze-
outs in the thirty months prior to Siliconix increases to 13% (15 out of 117), still substantially lower than the 28% 
rate for tender offers in the thirty months after Siliconix. 
27 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). 
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transactional form is in tension with the common assumption in the academic literature that 
practitioners have made frequent use of the Siliconix mechanism to avoid entire fairness review, 
and with some practitioner claims that virtually all freeze-outs since Siliconix  have been 
executed via tender offer.
28  I explore this point in Part 4.4 below. 
Examining further the twenty-seven deals that were executed via tender offer, in only two 
situations (both cases in which there were no independent directors) did the target not establish a 
special committee of independent directors to assess the transaction, negotiate with the 
controller, and provide a recommendation to the minority shareholders.   This finding supports 
the point made by Pritchard (2004) and Abramczyk, Cincilla & Honaker (2003) that minority 
shareholders in a tender offer freeze-out still (almost always) have a bargaining agent in the form 
of a special committee. The question remains, however, whether the SC can bargain as 
effectively in the tender offer context as in a merger.  A final point on the upper half of Figure 2 
is that the consummation rate for tender offer freeze-outs is high: 25 out of 27, or 93%, 
compared to 51 out of 69 (74%) for merger freeze-outs. 
Turning to the lower half of the Figure 2 roadmap, the general picture of the merger process 
seems to be vigorous bargaining between the SC and the controller, indicated both by the high 
rate of SC formation (65 out of 69 deals, or 94%) and the high rate of impasse between the 
controller and the SC (18 out of 65 deals, or 28%).  In contrast, conditional on SC approval, 
minority shareholder approval seems to be a non-binding constraint: only 36% of one-step 
merger deals (16 out of 44) were subject to a MOM condition, and all deals that were subject to a 
MOM condition received the requisite minority shareholder support.  I return to this point in Part 
5 below. 
                                                 
28 For example, a partner at a major New York City law firm states: “I am not sure I can think of a going-private 
deal since Pure Resources [in August 2002] that has been done the old-fashioned way of negotiating a one-step 
merger agreement with a special committee of the target.”  David Marcus, Cleaning Up Your Corporate Structure, 
CORPORATE CONTROL ALERT, at 20 (July 2003).  In fact there have been 33 of these “old fashioned” deals since 
Pure Resources, and (as shown in Figure 2) 69 since Siliconix.  Cf. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 443 (“The absence 
of convincing reasons for this disparity in treatment inspires the plaintiffs to urge me to apply the entire fairness 
standard of review to Unocal’s offer.  Otherwise, they say, the important protections set forth in the Lynch line of 
cases will be rendered useless, as all controlling shareholders will simply choose to proceed to make subsidiary 
acquisitions by way of a tender offer and later short-form merger.”) (emphasis added).  
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transactional form. 
 [insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows that 60% of freeze-out targets are Delaware corporations, higher than 
Delaware’s overall market share of approximately 50% among U.S. publicly-traded companies 
(Subramanian 2002, Bebchuk & Cohen 2003).  Delaware’s larger market share among freeze-
outs may be due to its more well-developed case law, which might promote freeze-outs, or 
because companies that contemplate moving between public and private status are more likely to 
incorporate in Delaware, or both. 
On controlling shareholder characteristics, Table 1 shows that 6% are private equity buyers, 
with the remaining controllers split roughly evenly between individuals (or family groups) and 
corporate parents.  Examining differences by transactional form, corporate parents are over-
represented in the tender offer arena.  Table 1 also shows that tender offers are larger deals than 
mergers.  These two findings might be related, in that corporate parents may be more likely to 
hold controlling stakes in larger companies.  Outside counsel with substantial M&A experience 
are also over-represented among tender offers, relative to mergers. 
On deal characteristics, less than 20% of freeze-outs overall, including tender offer freeze-
outs, involve stock rather than cash.  This finding is inconsistent with Gilson & Gordon’s claim 
that most post-Siliconix freeze-out tender offers have been for stock,
29 and also reveals that the 
disclosure of the bankers’ valuation opinion, as urged in Pure Resources, is redundant for the 
80% of freeze-outs that are subject to the same requirement under SEC Rule 13e-3. 
On offer conditions, all but one tender offer freeze-out (96%) included a back-end guarantee 
at the same price as the initial offer.
30  More interestingly, Figure 2 shows that only 36% of all 
                                                 
29 Gilson & Gordon at 785 n.172. 
30 See, e.g., RDO Equipment SC-TO-C filed by Ronald D. Offutt (Dec. 17, 2002) (“If the conditions to his offer 
were satisfied and the offer completed, Mr. Offutt stated that he would subsequently effect a ‘short-form’ merger of 
the Company with his acquisition entity. In this merger, the remaining Company stockholders would receive the 
same price paid in the tender offer, except for those stockholders who elected to exercise their appraisal rights under 
Delaware corporate law.”).  One back-end guarantee in the sample was not airtight.  See SBC Communications 
Schedule SC-TO-T (“Q: If SBC Internet consummates the tender offer, what are its plans with respect to all the 
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this proportion increases to only 45% when 90% conditions in two-step merger freeze-outs are 
included as well.  This low incidence is consistent with the fact that current Delaware doctrine 
shifts the burden on entire fairness with either a SC process or a MOM condition.  Because the 
vast majority of post-Siliconix merger freeze-outs went through a SC process, there is no further 
inducement in these deals for the controller to provide a MOM condition.  This analysis supports 
the argument by Allen, Jacobs & Strine (2001) that greater judicial deference to freeze-outs that 
include a MOM condition might in fact lead to greater procedural protections for the minority. 
On outcomes, Table 1 shows that freeze-out tender offers close in 100 days on average, 
compared to 194 days for mergers.  This timing difference is consistent with conventional 
wisdom among practitioners that tender offers can serve to get cash to minority shareholders 
more quickly.
31  In tender offer freeze-outs, 74% of minority shareholders, on average, tendered 
in to the front-end tender offer, though this statistic masks variation ranging from 20% of 
minority shares tendered (IIC Industries) to 99% (National Home Centers).  Note that the 
average tender is lower than the supermajority needed for a controller with less than a 62% stake 
in the target.
32 
This last finding has implications for the potential interaction between Hypotheses H1 and 
H2.  Because Figure 2 shows that all merger freeze-outs that are approved by the SC eventually 
closed, the minority approval requirement (when it exists) may not be a binding constraint for 
merger freeze-outs.  In contrast, when the controller proceeds via tender offer, the relatively low 
                                                                                                                                                             
shares that are not tendered in the offer?  A: If we consummate the tender offer, we intend to cause a merger to 
occur between Prodigy and SBC Internet . . . SBC Internet presently intends that the cash consideration paid in the 
merger will be the same as paid in the tender offer.”) (emphasis added).   I record this deal as having a back-end 
guarantee because, absent a change in circumstances, a lower price would have invited a fair price claim.  Delaware 
law seems to require “the statement of intent to be sufficiently clear as to expose it [the controller] to potential 
liability in the event that it were to obtain 90% and not consummate the short-form merger at the same price.”  See 
Pure Resources, 808 A.2d 421, 447 n.51.  
31 See, e.g., WorldPort Communications SC-TO-T (filed Dec. 23, 2002) (“Q: Why is [the controlling shareholder] 
not seeking approval of its offer from WorldPort’s independent directors?  A:  We want to begin to realize the 
benefits of taking WorldPort private as soon as possible and believe that making a tender offer directly to WorldPort 
stockholders will be significantly faster than making a proposal for consideration by WorldPort's independent 
directors and negotiating a merger agreement with those directors. We believe that the WorldPort stockholders are 
capable of evaluating the fairness of the Offer. We also note that over 80% of the shares not owned by us would 
need to be tendered to satisfy the Minimum Condition. Accordingly, we are not seeking to negotiate our Offer with 
WorldPort.”). 
32 A controller with a 62% stake needs 28% out of the remaining 38% (=74% of the minority) in order to achieve 
90% control. 
  17
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art17average tender suggests that minority approval may be a binding constraint in some deals in 
determining the final freeze-out price.   
Anecdotal evidence supports the possibility that minority approval is a binding constraint in 
tender offer freeze-outs.  For example, in February 2002, the KPN Group announced a tender 
offer at $2.25 cash per share for the remaining 47% of EuroWeb International that it did not own.  
As a 53% controller KPN needed 79% of the minority to tender (37% out of the remaining 47%) 
in order to achieve 90% voting control that would allow it to execute a short-form merger.  
EuroWeb formed a SC that recommended against the proposal, and a slim majority of the 
minority (55%) tendered into the offer.
33  Still needing another 24% of the minority to tender, 
KPN increased its offer to $2.70 per share.  The SC recommended against this sweetened offer, 
and in April 2002 the KPN tender offer expired with insufficient shares tendered.
34 
In short, the summary statistics presented in Figure 2 and Table 1 suggest that the minority 
approval requirement (H2) might be the binding constraint in tender offer freeze-outs, and SC 
bargaining power (H1) might be the binding constraint in merger freeze-outs in determining deal 
price.  I test this possible interaction in the multivariate analysis below. 
Finally, Table 1 reveals large differences in the outcome of the bargaining process between 
tender offers and mergers.  Consistent with Hypothesis H1, Table 1 shows that negotiated prices, 
as measured by increases over controllers’ first offers and premiums over pre-deal market prices, 
are higher, on average, when the controller uses a merger compared to a tender offer.  These 
differences are statistically and economically significant: a 10.9% difference in increases over 
first offers, and 17-30% differences in premiums.  I explore these differences in more detail in 
Part 4.3 below. 
4.3. Outcomes 
I now examine the outcomes of freeze-out negotiations between the controller and the special 
committee in more detail, taking the transactional form used by the controller as exogenous. 
Although quantitatively assessing the effectiveness of the special committee against the 
                                                 
33 See EuroWeb International 13E-3/A (filed March 20, 2002). 
34 EuroWeb remains a public company today.  As of March 31, 2004 the Euroweb stock price was $4.95. 
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often cited by the special committee itself in its communications to shareholders advocating the 
transaction: first, the percentage increase from the controller’s first offer to the controller’s final 
offer; and second, the premium paid by the controller over the pre-deal market price of the stock, 
using baseline dates one day prior, one week prior, and four weeks prior to the announcement of 
the transaction.
35 
4.3.1. Increases over controller’s first offer 
I first examine the percentage increase from the controller’s first offer to the controller’s final 
offer.  I define the first offer as the first formal offer that the controller makes to the target board.  
This offer is sometimes disclosed publicly at the time it is made, through a press release and 8-K 
filing by the target company, though more often it is disclosed after the transaction is announced 
in the company’s Schedule 14A filing.  In five transactions the controller proposed a price range 
as its first offer;
36 in these cases I use the midpoint of the range as the first offer.  Interestingly, in 
no case did the SC make the first offer, although in some transactions there were substantial 
discussions between the controller and the SC before the controller made its offer.  Four 
transactions provide insufficient information in the target’s SEC filings in order to be able to 
determine the controller’s first offer.  These transactions are omitted from the results reported in 
this Part. 
I define the final offer as the final agreed price at which the transaction closes.  Because a 
final offer requires a completed transaction, I exclude failed transactions from the analysis.  The 
first offer and final offer for freeze-outs using stock are the proposed and agreed upon stock 
exchange ratios.  This approach avoids having to convert exchange ratios into cash equivalents, 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., National Home Centers, Schedule 14D-9 (filed August 14, 2001) (“The Offer Price represents a 22% 
premium over the $1.15 closing price per share of NHC common stock on October 4, 2001, the last trading day prior 
to the public announcement by NHC of the Offer Price.  Based upon the course of discussions with the Purchaser, 
including the fact that Mr. Newman [the controlling shareholder] raised his initial proposed offer price from $1.20 
per share, the Special Committee and the Board believed that the Purchaser would not be willing to pay more than 
$1.40 per Share.”); Lexent Press Release (dated July 10, 2003) (“[Minority shareholders] will receive $1.50 per 
share in cash, an increase of $0.25 or 20% of the initial offer of $1.25 per share and an increase of 65% over the 
closing price of $0.91 on February 14, 2003, the date Lexent announced the Buying Group’s initial offer of $1.25 
per share.”). 
36 See, e.g., RDO Equipment Press Release (Dec. 16, 2002) (“Mr. Offutt [the controller] stated in his letter that he 
has not yet finally decided the offering price he is willing to pay for the Company shares he does not own.   
However, he has indicated that he is currently considering an offer in a range of $5.22 to $5.66 per share.”). 
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example, if the controller increases the exchange ratio in a stock freeze-out from 0.50 shares to 
0.55 shares, this is recorded as a 10% increase rather than converting 0.50 shares and 0.55 shares 
to cash equivalents on the dates that these offers were made. 
As a starting point, Table 1 shows a large and statistically significant difference in the 
percentage increase from the first offer to the final offer based on the transactional form used: 
when the freeze-out is structured as a merger, the controller increases its offer by 18.1% on 
average, compared to 7.2%, on average, when the freeze-out is executed as a tender offer.   
Median increases are equally striking: 11.6% for mergers, compared to 4.2% for tender offers.  
These findings are consistent with Hypothesis H1.  Figure 3 provides additional detail behind the 
aggregate statistics reported in Table 1. 
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Figure 3 shows that nearly half of all controlling shareholders (11 out of 24) who execute 
successful tender offer freeze-outs do not increase their first offers.  This basic finding is in 
tension with academic claims that special committees have bargaining power in tender offer 
freeze-outs.  In addition, only 13% of controllers (3 out of 24) increased their first offers by more 
than 20% in tender offer freeze-outs, and only 4% (1 out of 24) increased their first offers by 
more than 25%.   Figure 3 reveals a different picture when the freeze-out is structured as a 
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at least 10%, and more than one quarter of controllers (12 out of 45) increase their first offers by 
more than 25%.  These findings are consistent with the view that SC’s have greater bargaining 
power against the controller in freeze-out mergers than in freeze-out tender offers. 
Analysis of SC recommendations in tender offer freeze-outs sheds additional light on the 
SC’s bargaining power against the controller.  Among the 27 tender offer freeze-outs in the 
sample, the SC approved the final offer price in 18 deals (67%), remained neutral in three deals 
(11%), and recommended against the final offer price in four deals (15%).  As indicated in 
Figure 2, in the remaining two transactions the target board did not create an SC to negotiate 
with the controller.  The controller successfully completed its freeze-out in all 21 deals in which 
the SC approved the final offer price or remained neutral.  In the four deals in which the SC 
recommended against the final offer price, the controller was successful in two deals and was 
unsuccessful in two deals.  This last finding indicates that SC approval is not a prerequisite for 
the controller’s success in a tender offer freeze-out.  If, as an empirical matter, controllers were 
generally unsuccessful when the SC recommended against the transaction, the SC 
recommendation would become valuable to the controller in a way that might give the SC de 
facto veto power, or at least greater bargaining power, against the controller.  Instead, the 50% 
success rate for controllers even without SC approval suggests that SC’s in tender offer freeze-
outs do not have veto power, unlike SC’s in merger freeze-outs.  This difference may provide at 
least part of the explanation for the differences in outcomes reported in Table 1 and Figure 3. 
In order to jointly examine Hypotheses H1 and H2, Table 2A presents statistics on first 
offers, divided by the transactional form used and the level of support required from minority 
shareholders. 
[insert Table 2A about here] 
The columns of Table 2A distinguish tender offer freeze-outs from merger freeze-outs.  The 
rows of Table 2A distinguish whether the controller needs “high” or “low” support from 
minority shareholders.  I classify tender offer freeze-outs as requiring “high” approval when the 
controller holds a below-median pre-deal stake in the target.  The median pre-deal stake among 
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requiring “high” approval when the deal includes a MOM condition (in a one-step merger) or a 
90% condition (in a merger executed as a two-step tender offer).   
Consistent with Hypothesis H1 and the data presented in Figure 3, Table 2A shows that 
controlling shareholders make fewer concessions, as measured by increases over first offers, in 
tender offer freeze-outs than in merger freeze-outs.  With respect to Hypothesis H2, the evidence 
is mixed.  In tender offer freeze-outs, the evidence is directionally consistent with Hypothesis 
H2: controllers make larger concessions to the SC when it needs large support from minority 
shareholders.  In merger freeze-outs, however, there is no statistically significant difference 
based on the level of minority support required; in fact, merger freeze-outs without a MOM 
condition yield directionally greater increases than merger freeze-outs with a MOM condition.  
One possible interpretation of this latter finding is that Hypothesis H2 is not a binding constraint 
in merger freeze-outs, because the SC does all the “work” to push up the price and the SC’s 
bargaining power does not depend on the level of minority support needed.  Another possibility, 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, is that a controlling shareholder may pay more in order for 
the SC to abandon the MOM condition.  That is, the SC may bargain away a MOM condition in 
exchange for a higher price from the controller.  This possibility, if correct, would be consistent 
with Coates & Subramanian (2000), which finds a correlation between deal protection devices 
such as break-up fees and higher premiums in third-party (arms-length) acquisitions. 
Of course, one concern with the analysis of outcomes thus far is that first offers may be 
endogenous to final offers.  For example, because Figure 3 shows that first offers are more likely 
to “stick” in the case of a tender offer, a controller who knows this fact may be more likely to 
offer closer to its best price as a first offer.  If first offers are endogenous, then increases over 
first offers do not provide an accurate measure of the controller’s concession to the special 
committee.  To attempt to address this concern, I now turn to evidence on deal premiums relative 
to the targets’ pre-deal market price. 
4.3.2. Premiums over pre-deal price 
In contrast to first offers, pre-deal market prices are relatively exogenous to the negotiation 
process between the controller and the target’s special committee.  However, using premiums 
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because the minority stock in companies with a controlling shareholder is often thinly traded; in 
fact it is this point that often motivates the controller to freeze out the minority in the first place.  
In this Part I present data on premiums paid in freeze-out transactions over the pre-deal market 
price, again divided between tender offer and merger freeze-outs.  Because market prices 
fluctuate, and because, more specifically, the pre-deal stock price may increase due to rumors of 
an impending freeze-out, I use three baseline dates: one day prior to the announcement date of 
the deal; one week prior to the announcement date; and four weeks prior.   I adjust the premium 
received for market movements between the three baseline dates and the announcement date, 
using the CRSP value-weighted index.  Tables 2B, 2C, and 2D present summary statistics. 
[insert Tables 2B, 2C & 2D about here] 
The results reported in Tables 2B-2D all demonstrate a pattern that is directionally consistent 
with Hypotheses H1 and H2.  In each table, mean and median premiums are lower in tender 
offers than in mergers, for both “low” and “high” levels of minority approval and overall.  This 
finding is consistent with Hypothesis H1.  Further, Tables 2B-2D all show that, for a given 
transactional form, mean and median premiums are higher when the controller requires a high 
level of minority shareholder support, consistent with Hypothesis H2.  Visually, premiums are 
increasing in the south and easterly direction in all three tables 2B-2D. 
The findings reported in Tables 2A-2D also provide some evidence on the endogeneity of 
first offers to final outcomes.  Putting together the findings from Tables 2A and 2B, I estimate 
that the average first offer in a tender offer freeze-out represents a 25% premium over the pre-
deal market price, and the average first offer in a merger freeze-out represents a 28% premium 
over pre-deal market price.
37  This finding is inconsistent with the theory that first offers are 
endogenous to final outcomes, which would predict that controllers in freeze-out tender offers 
should make higher first offers, relative to pre-deal market price, because such offers need to be 
                                                 
37 Consider a target company with a pre-deal stock price of $100, and a controller with an above-median stake.  
Using the premium data from Table 2B, the predicted final outcome in a tender offer freeze-out would be $133.80 
per share and the predicted outcome in a statutory merger freeze-out would be $151.00.  Table 6A then permits 
working back to average first offers: $124.81 for the tender offer (=$133.80 / 1.072) and $127.86 (= $151.00 / 
1.181) for the statutory merger, implying premiums of 25% and 28%, respectively, for first offers.  Results are 
directionally the same if I use premiums from Tables 2C or 2D instead. 
  23
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art17increased by less.  This finding also highlights the bargaining power that a controller has in a 
freeze-out tender offer: the controller starts lower, and increases its offer by less, compared to a 
controller in a merger freeze-out. 
In the next Part I control for other factors that might influence the bargaining process 
between the controller and the special committee in freeze-outs. 
4.3.3. Multivariate analysis 
I now control for target characteristics, controlling shareholder characteristics, and deal 
characteristics that might influence the bargaining relationship between the controller and the 
special committee.   For the dependent variable I use the four outcome measures as described 
above: the percentage increase over the controller’s first offer, and premiums paid over the pre-
deal market price of the stock one day prior, one week prior, and four weeks prior to the deal 
announcement date, adjusted for market movements over these periods. 
To test Hypothesis H1, I include a dummy variable TENDER, set to 1 if the freeze-out is 
executed as a tender offer.  Hypothesis H1 predicts that the TENDER coefficient will be 
statistically significant and negative.  To test Hypothesis H2, I include a scalar variable 
MINREQ, which measures the percent of minority shares that the controller needs in order to 
close the transaction.  MINREQ ranges from 0 for merger freeze-outs without a MOM in which 
the controller holds more than 50% of the voting shares, to 50 for mergers with a MOM 
condition, to more than 80 for some tender offer freeze-outs made by relatively small controlling 
shareholders.  Hypothesis H2 predicts that the MINREQ coefficient will be statistically 
significant and positive. 
I also include several controls.  First, I include a dummy variable DEINC, set to 1 for targets 
incorporated in Delaware.  Although other states generally follow Delaware corporate law on 
most issues involving fundamental transactions (e.g., Subramanian 2003b), Delaware targets 
may be different from targets in other states which have not yet explicitly articulated a standard 
of review for freeze-out transactions executed through tender offer.  Because this difference 
between Delaware and non-Delaware targets is potentially important, I also run the model on 
Delaware targets only.  Second, I control for the identity of the controlling shareholder, using the 
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size of the deal (LNVAL, defined as the natural log of deal value) and whether the consideration 
is stock or cash (STOCK, set to 1 for stock deals). 
All models are run as ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.  Because Cook-Weisberg 
tests indicate heteroskedasticity, I report White-corrected standard errors.  The results are 
reported in Tables 3A & 3B. 
[insert Tables 3A & 3B about here] 
In Table 3A, the TENDER coefficient is negative and statistically significant in all models, 
providing strong support for Hypothesis H1.  In Table 3B the TENDER coefficient continues to 
be negative in all models but is only statistically significant in two out of four regressions.  The 
weaker results in Table 3B may be due at least in part to the smaller sample size.  In Table 3A, 
the difference in outcomes between tender offer and merger freeze-outs is economically 
meaningful.  Using the method of recycled predictions and the coefficients from Model #4 in 
Table 3A, I estimate that the average premium paid over the target’s stock price four weeks prior 
to deal announcement decreases from 56.8% to 21.3% when a controller uses a tender offer 
rather than a merger.  Using the median transaction value of $14.5 million from Table 1, this 
difference implies that controllers who executed their freeze-outs as mergers paid an extra $3.2 
million to the minority, on average. 
In contrast to these findings on Hypothesis H1, the results in Tables 3A and 3B do not 
support Hypothesis H2.  The MINREQ coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the 
models, and has a negative sign (inconsistent with H2) in several regressions.  In unreported 
regressions I use non-linear transformations of MINREQ and calculate MINREQ as a fraction of 
shares outstanding rather than the fraction of minority shares, and also do not obtain statistically 
significant results. 
While the results in Tables 3A-3B do not support Hypothesis H2 on its own, a potential 
interaction between Hypotheses H1 and H2 still remains possible.  As described in Part 3, 
Hypothesis H2 might be a binding constraint only for tender offers.  In order to test this 
possibility, I replace the dummy variable TENDER with a new variable TENDER*CONTROL, 
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above the threshold stake of 35%.  For tender offers, CONTROL represents a monotonic 
transformation of MINREQ that tests the hypothesis that the difference in outcomes between 
tender offer freeze-outs and merger freeze-outs increases as the level of necessary minority 
support declines.  As in Table 3 I run the model on all targets in the sample and also on Delaware 
targets only. The results are reported in Table 4. 
[Insert Tables 4A & 4B here] 
The results in Table 4A and 4B generally support the H1/H2 interaction.  The 
TENDER*CONTROL coefficient is negative and statistically significant in all models, at at least 
90% confidence.  This finding is consistent with the joint hypothesis that controllers pay less in 
tender offers relative to merger freeze-outs, and this difference increases with the controller’s 
stake.  One intuitive explanation for this finding is that when the controller is relatively small, the 
supermajority approval needed from the minority in a tender offer provides built-in protection 
that compensates for the SC’s lower bargaining power.  In contrast, when the controller is large, 
the controlling shareholder can more effectively “turn the screws” against the SC because it does 
not need supermajority approval from the minority.  To use the vocabulary introduced by Vice 
Chancellor Strine in Pure Resources,
38 bigger gorillas seem to take more of the bananas in tender 
offer freeze-outs. 
Examining other variables, the coefficient for private equity controlling shareholders is 
statistically significant but not consistent in sign across models.  This may be a spurious 
correlation due to the relatively small number of private equity controlling shareholders in the 
sample (Table 1).  No other variables are statistically significant at 95% confidence in any of the 
models reported in Tables 4A or 4B. 
                                                 
38 See Pure Resources 808 A.2d 421, 435 (“In colloquial terms, the Supreme Court saw the controlling stockholder 
as the 800-pound gorilla whose urgent hunger for the rest of the bananas is likely to frighten less powerful primates 
like putatively independent directors who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla (and who at the very least 
owed their seats on the board to his support).”). 
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The finding that controlling shareholders pay less in tender offer freeze-outs than in statutory 
merger freeze-outs may be surprising in view of the fact that few, if any, barriers exist to 
choosing one transactional form or the other.  Therefore, one might expect statutory merger 
freeze-outs to be negotiated in the “shadow” of a tender offer freeze-out.  Here the somewhat 
byzantine Delaware case law requires a careful dance by the controller in its negotiations with 
the SC: while the controller cannot threaten a tender offer freeze-out as a means of forcing the 
SC to accept the offer on the table,
39 it is free to break off negotiations with the SC and simply 
commence a tender offer directly to the minority.
40  If the controller and the SC know this fact, 
one might expect outcomes in merger freeze-outs to be statistically indistinguishable from 
outcomes in tender offer freeze-outs.  The evidence presented in the previous Part is inconsistent 
with this prediction. 
As a potential variation on this theme, we might expect to see convergence in outcomes 
between tender offer freeze-outs and merger freeze-outs as lawyers and law firms become more 
comfortable with the tender offer mechanism, and a tender offer therefore becomes a better 
understood implicit threat in the freeze-out merger negotiations.
41  To test this theory, I include 
in the Table 3 models a new interaction variable TENDER*LTREND, in which LTREND is 
calculated as the natural log of the number of days between the Siliconix decision and the deal 
announcement date.  If merger freeze-outs are increasingly negotiated in the shadow of a tender 
offer freeze-out, as controlling shareholders and/or their legal counsel become more aware of the 
benefits of the tender offer route, the coefficient for the new TENDER*LTREND variable 
should be statistically significant and positive.  However, in unreported regressions, I find that 
this new interaction variable, as well as standard transformations, is not stable in magnitude or 
sign, and is not statistically significant. 
An alternative possibility is that merger freeze-outs are not negotiated in the shadow of a 
tender offer freeze-out, either because a tender offer freeze-out is not a viable substitute for 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
40 See, e.g., In re Siliconix Shareholders’ Litigation, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
41 I thank Jeff Gordon for this hypothesis. 
  27
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art17certain types of deals, or because certain law firms are not aware of the benefits of the tender 
offer route, or both.  I examine this possibility in the next Part. 
4.4. Transactional form 
I now turn to the determinants of transactional form between mergers and tender offers.  The 
theory developed in Part 3 predicts that the likelihood of using a tender offer should be 
increasing in the controller’s stake (H3), and that outside counsel with significant M&A 
experience should be more likely to use a tender offer (H4).  Following Coates (2001), I use the 
number of prior M&A transactions as a proxy for the M&A experience of the controller’s 
outside counsel.  Specifically, I use the Thomson Financial Corporation M&A database to 
tabulate the number of deals in which each law firm was either an advisor to the acquirer or the 
target, for all arms-length mergers and acquisitions of U.S. public companies during the period 
1990-2003.   I classify the fifteen law firms that have advised on the largest number of deals as 
“experienced” M&A law firms.
42   
4.4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 5A presents summary statistics on the incidence of tender offer freeze-outs, divided by 
the controller’s pre-deal stake and the M&A experience of the controller’s outside counsel.   
Because preliminary analysis of the data suggests an inflection point at 70% control, I divide the 
sample between below and above 70% control.  Table 5B presents the same summary statistics 
for Delaware targets only. 
[insert Tables 5A & 5B about here] 
Overall, Tables 5A and 5B support Hypotheses H3 and H4.  Examining all deals in the 
sample, Table 5A shows that 45% percent of controllers with high control executed their freeze-
outs via tender offer, compared to 17% of controllers with low pre-deal control.  This difference 
is statistically significant at 95% confidence and supports Hypothesis H3.   On the M&A 
                                                 
42 In descending order, these law firms are (number of deals in parentheses): Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
(793), Sullivan & Cromwell (670), Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett (503), Shearman & Sterling (448), Dewey 
Ballantine (448), Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell (440), Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (428), Fried Frank (352), 
Richards, Layton & Finger (327), Cravath, Swaine & Moore (312), Davis, Polk & Wardwell (275), Latham & 
Watkins (274), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (263), Cleary Gottleib (257), and Jones Day (236). 
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experienced outside counsel were executed via tender offer, compared to 21% of deals with less 
experienced outside counsel.  This difference is also statistically significant at 95% confidence 
and supports Hypothesis H4.    
When Delaware targets only are examined, Table 5B shows that these differences become 
more pronounced and statistically stronger, consistent with the view that Siliconix provides a 
clearer path in Delaware than it does in other states.  Specifically, among the eleven Delaware 
freeze-outs that were executed by a large controller advised by experienced outside counsel, all 
but one (91%) were executed via tender offer.  This finding might provide a reconciliation 
between New York City practitioners’ impressions that virtually all freeze-outs are executed via 
tender offer, and the evidence presented in this paper that more than two-thirds are not.   
Interestingly, the one exception among the eleven deals in this category was Samuel 
Heyman’s freeze-out of the minority shareholders of International Specialty Products (ISP) in 
July 2002.  Heyman has established a reputation over the past three decades as a tough bargainer 
in the takeover arena.  For example, according to Bruck (1989:287), even junk bond king 
Michael Milkin, at the height of his power at Drexel Burnham Lambert in the mid-1980s, was 
willing to “take a beating” from Heyman in deal financing negotiations.  Heyman’s reputation, 
then, may have given him considerable bargaining power against the ISP special committee 
despite going through the merger route.  Consistent with this view, Heyman increased his first 
offer by only 3% (from $10.00 to $10.30) in order to gain SC approval.
43 
Overall, the differences in tender offer incidence between experienced and less experienced 
firms are larger and statistically stronger when the controller holds a large stake, suggesting a 
                                                 
43 The end-game is particularly interesting: “On November 4, 2002, the Majority Stockholder authorized his legal 
advisors to indicate his potential willingness to increase the per share merger consideration to $10.30 per share 
[from $10.25].  In a meeting on that day, the special committee discussed the fairness of the proposal to ISP’s 
minority stockholders and agreed to reject the proposal of $10.30 per share, but to inform the Majority Stockholder’s 
representative that . . . it would consider recommending the proposal at $10.35 per share.  The Majority 
Stockholder’s representative stated that the Majority Stockholder would not accept that share price, and that if the 
special committee could not recommend the proposed transaction at $10.30 per share that the Majority Stockholder 
would withdraw the offer. . . . On November 6, 2002, the special committee met to discuss the Majority 
Stockholder’s response to the special committee’s attempts to increase the offer price of $10.30 per share. . . .  On 
November 7, the parties announced that the Majority Stockholder and the special committee had reached an 
agreement with respect to the merger at a price of $10.30 per share in cash, subject to approval by ISP’s board of 
directors.”  See International Specialty Products Schedule 13D. 
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factors that might influence transactional form, in the multivariate analysis presented in the next 
Part. 
4.4.2. Multivariate analysis 
I now run a multivariate regression to control for other factors that might influence choice of 
transactional form.  The dependent variable is TENDER, set to 1 if the controller executed the 
freeze-out through a tender offer, and 0 if the controller executed the freeze-out through a 
statutory merger.  To test Hypothesis H3, I include a continuous variable TMINREQ, which 
measures the percent of minority shares that would be needed in a tender offer freeze-out.   
TMINREQ is inversely correlated with the controller’s pre-deal stake, as described in Part 3.2.  
Hypothesis H3 predicts that the coefficient for TMINREQ should be statistically significant and 
negative.   
To test Hypothesis H4, I model law firm experience in three ways.  In one specification I 
include a dummy variable EXPERIENCED?, set to 1 if the controller’s outside counsel has 
substantial M&A experience as defined above.  In a second specification I include the 
continuous variable EXPERIENCED?*CONTROL, to test a potential interaction between 
Hypotheses H3 and H4.  In a third specification I include the dichotomous variable 
EXPERIENCED?*HIGHCONTROL?, in which HIGHCONTROL? equals 1 for deals in which 
the controller’s pre-deal stake is 70% or more.  This third specification makes use of the 
inflection point suggested in Table 5 and provides a discontinuous test of the H3/H4 interaction.  
The prediction is that all of these variables will be positive and statistically significant. 
In order to further test Hypothesis H4, I include a continuous variable LTREND in certain 
specifications, defined as in the previous Part.  If law firms learned over time about the benefits 
of the tender offer mechanism, LTREND should be statistically significant and positive as well. 
As in the previous Part I include controls for Delaware incorporation, the identity of the 
controller, the size of the transaction, and the consideration used.  The model is run as a probit 
regression, though results are virtually identical if I run the model as a logit.  The results are 
reported in Tables 6A and 6B. 
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The results generally support Hypothesis H3.  The TMINREQ coefficient is negative in all 
but one model and is statistically significant in three out of four models in Table 6A.  The results 
provide some, though weaker, support for Hypothesis H4 and the interaction between H3 and 
H4.  In Model #2, the EXPERIENCED? dummy variable is positive in both Table 6A and 6B, 
consistent with H4, though it is statistically significant at 90% confidence only in Table 6B.  In 
Model #3, EXPERIENCED*CONTROL again is positive in both models and statistically 
significant at 90% confidence in Table 6B.  The strongest results are in Model #4, in which the 
EXPERIENCED?*HIGHCONTROL? dummy variable is significant at 90% confidence in Table 
6A and at 95% confidence in Table 6B.  Overall, the results suggest that experienced law firms 
have a stronger inclination toward tender offers when the target is incorporated in Delaware, 
again consistent with the intuition that Siliconix provides a clearer path for Delaware targets than 
it does for targets in other states. 
The coefficients for LNVAL are positive in all models, and statistically significant in five out 
of eight models.   One possibility is that tender offers entail higher fixed costs than mergers, and 
so a tender offer becomes more likely as these fixed costs can be amortized over a larger deal 
value.  Another possibility is that controllers are more likely to hire experienced outside counsel 
in larger deals, and experienced counsel are more likely to recommend the tender offer route.
44  
In this second scenario the LNVAL coefficient would be capturing some of the influence of 
outside counsel in the transaction form decision.  In unreported regressions I exclude LNVAL 
from the Table 6 model; in these regressions the coefficients for EXPERIENCED?, 
EXPERIENCED?*CONTROL, and EXPERIENCED*HIGHCONTROL? are all statistically 
significant in the predicted direction, at 95% in the Table 6A models and at 99% in the Table 6B 
models.  
However, the results on law firm experience are generally less robust than the other findings 
presented in this paper.  In unreported regressions, I classify firms as “experienced” if they are 
among the top ten in M&A experience, or the top twenty, rather than the top fifteen.  I also use 
continuous variables EXPERIENCE and LOG(EXPERIENCE), which simply measure the 
                                                 
44 I thank Ron Gilson for this hypothesis. 
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2003.  In these alternative specifications, the EXPERIENCE coefficients are generally positive, 
consistent with Hypothesis H4, but generally not statistically significant at any conventional 
level.  One possible interpretation of these (non)findings is that law firm network and learning 
effects operate among a particular set of New York City and Wilmington, Delaware law firms, 
rather than being more continuous. 
In addition to the fragility of the law firm result, I cannot rule out the possibility that a 
controller is more likely to hire experienced outside counsel when it knows that it will execute its 
freeze-out via tender offer – that is, a client-driven effect rather than a lawyer-driven effect.  In 
order to attempt to isolate the causal chain running from choice of outside counsel to 
transactional form chosen, I use a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach.  Following the 
methodology introduced by Maddala (1983:246) and illustrated by Comment & Schwert (1995), 
I first run a probit regression to predict whether the controller will choose outside counsel that 
has substantial M&A experience.  In the second-stage regression I replace the dummy variable 
EXPERIENCED? with predicted values from the first-stage model.  In these regressions 
(unreported), I find that the coefficients for EXPERIENCED?, EXPERIENCED*CONTROL, 
and EXPERIENCED*HIGHCONTROL? are consistently positive, as in Table 6, but they are not 
statistically significant at any conventional level.  I therefore cannot rule out the possibility that 
the apparent connection between experienced outside counsel and transactional form is in fact 
driven by client selection of outside counsel. 
The STOCK coefficient is negative in all models and statistically significant in Model #1.  
This result presents something of a puzzle.  Historically this finding might have been explained 
by the fact that the time required for stock registration would have eliminated one of the primary 
benefits of a tender offer, namely, speed, as reported in Table 1.  However, the SEC’s Reg. M-A 
release, issued in January 2000, sought to level the playing field between stock exchange offers 
and cash tender offers by allowing exchange offers to begin before the registration statement 
became effective.  One possible explanation for the result in Tables 6A and 6B is that Reg. M-A 
did not truly level the playing field between stock and cash offers.  Another possible explanation 
is that practitioners have not completely adapted to the new regime that Reg. M-A provides.  
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At the highest level, the evidence presented in this paper rejects the assumption in most 
academic and practitioner commentary that many if not most post-Siliconix  freeze-outs are 
executed via tender offer.  To the contrary, I find that more than two-thirds of freeze-outs in the 
current doctrinal regime are still executed through the traditional merger route.  This divide in 
transactional form provides the basis for a natural experiment between tender offer and merger 
freeze-outs in the post-Siliconix era.  The evidence from this natural experiment provides new 
insights on both deal outcomes and choice of deal form. 
On outcomes, I find strong evidence that controlling shareholders are able to pay less in 
tender offer freeze-outs than in statutory merger freeze-outs.   Interviews as well as informal 
conversations with New York City and Delaware lawyers indicate that this finding is consistent 
with practitioner experience.  For example, reacting to an earlier version of this paper presented 
at a panel discussion at the Harvard Law School, Jim Morphy, head of the M&A practice at 
Sullivan & Cromwell, stated: 
In a tender offer the controlling stockholder, in effect, says to the other 
stockholders, “Here is my offer:  the stock was trading at $6.25, I’m willing to 
pay you $8.00.  That’s your choice – you can have $8.00 or you can have 
$6.25.”  Because it is difficult for stockholders, as a group, to bargain 
collectively, the tendency if you are a stockholder is to take the $8.00.  Someone 
might have a mathematical analysis of how this all works but that is essentially 
what takes place in the absence of an effective bargaining agent like a special 
committee.  In the merger scenario, given the difference in statutory and legal 
standards, the special committee is not as easily by-passed by the controlling 
stockholder.  Therefore its choice is not between $6.25 and $8.00.  Armed with 
information and sufficient authority, it can go out and negotiate for something 
better. 
Despite this consistency with practitioner experience, the finding on deal outcomes is in 
tension with some academic and judicial commentary that minority shareholders have equivalent 
protections in freeze-out tender offers and mergers.  For example, in Siliconix  itself, Vice 
Chancellor Noble reasoned that “as long as the tender offer is properly pursued, the free choice 
of the minority shareholders to reject the tender offer provides sufficient protection.”  The 
evidence presented in this paper suggests that this is not the case, at least as measured against the 
benchmark of the freeze-out merger process.   
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shareholders ever proceed via statutory merger?  On this question the evidence is less clear.  I 
present some evidence that controllers are more likely to proceed via merger when they hold a 
relatively small stake, presumably in order to avoid high minority shareholder approval that 
would be required in a tender offer.  I also present some evidence that controllers are more likely 
to proceed via tender offer when the controller’s outside counsel has substantial M&A 
experience, particularly if the target is a Delaware corporation.   Of course, these results on law 
firm experience cannot, on their own, demonstrate the direction of causation, and it remains 
possible that clients who were predisposed to go through the tender offer route were more likely 
to hire outside counsel with more M&A experience.  However, informal discussions with New 
York City practitioners suggests that the causation runs from law firms to transactional form, that 
is, a lawyer-driven effect rather than a client-driven effect, in which certain law firms, primarily 
headquartered in New York City, are more aware of, or comfortable with, “cutting edge” freeze-
out techniques.
45  If correct, this causal relationship suggests that some controlling shareholders 
paid more than they had to in their freeze-out transactions because of their choice of outside 
counsel. 
This conclusion is generally consistent with Coates (2001), which finds a difference between 
Silicon Valley and New York City law firms in the installation of takeover defenses at IPO firms 
during the period 1991-1992, but convergence between Silicon Valley and New York City firms 
by 1998.   In fact, this study and Coates (2001) represent bookends that portray a similar picture: 
at both entry (IPO) and exit (freeze-out) from public status, new corporate law practices 
(takeover defenses, tender offer freeze-outs) seem to disseminate slowly across law firms.   
Coates (2001) infers that the new practice in question (takeover defense) was beneficial to 
principals from the fact that the incidence of defenses increased over time.  This paper presents 
more direct evidence on the question of optimality for clients by examining deal outcomes.  
Assuming that controlling shareholders would generally prefer to pay less rather than more when 
freezing out the minority, the evidence presented here suggests that firms with more M&A 
experience were more effective in achieving this goal. 
                                                 
45 Cf. Pak Mail Schedule 14A (“The merger structure for the transaction was selected for, among other reasons, its 
structural simplicity and ease of administrative execution, as opposed to more complex transaction structures.”). 
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46 
The results presented in this paper support arguments for convergence between tender offers 
and mergers, on both welfare maximization and doctrinal coherence grounds.  On social welfare, 
this paper identifies more precisely the ex ante pricing calculation that is required under the 
current Delaware doctrinal regime.  Investors considering taking a minority position in a 
controlled company must estimate, first, the lower price that they will receive, in expectation, in 
a tender offer freeze-out under Siliconix, and second, the likelihood that the controller will 
proceed via tender offer rather than merger.   Systematic mis-estimation in either of these two 
steps (possibly due, e.g., to gradual shifts in legal guidance on choice of transactional form) will 
lead to mis-pricing of a minority position, which in turn will reduce allocational efficiency.  
Controllers may also be less able to attract investors into a minority position due to the economic 
uncertainty created by Siliconix, which reduces access to public capital. (La Porta, Lopez-
DeSilanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002)  Though controllers could mitigate these efficiency losses 
by committing ex ante to a certain transactional form, to my knowledge no controller since 
Siliconix has done so.  Thus the evidence presented in this paper bolsters arguments for doctrinal 
convergence between tender offers and mergers by identifying an efficiency loss (not just a one-
time wealth transfer) that the current regime creates. 
On doctrinal coherence, Delaware corporate law generally looks to the appraisal remedy for 
guidance in determining the fair value of minority shares (Coates 1999), and in appraisal 
Delaware law articulates a pro rata claim on the going concern value as the natural measure of a 
minority shareholder’s entitlement.
47  In this analysis transactional form cannot play a role.  The 
fact that it does as an empirical matter suggests either that Delaware doctrine must alter its 
conception of a fair entitlement in response to the transactional form used by the controller, or 
that the Delaware doctrine of freeze-outs should be made less sensitive to transactional form.  
Because the former doctrine is well-established while the latter is very much unresolved, it 
would seem that doctrinal convergence is the more plausible way forward. 
                                                 
46 In this Part I benefited greatly from insights developed at a panel discussion on freeze-outs held at the Harvard 
Law School on April 6, 2004, at which summary data from Part 4 was presented.  I am grateful to my fellow-
panelists Frank Balotti, Robert Clark, Jim Morphy, Gil Sparks, and Vice Chancellor Leo Strine for their 
interpretations of this data and more general observations on freeze-outs.  Of course, the views expressed here are 
solely my own and should not be attributed to the other panelists. 
47 See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).  
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important to note that entire fairness review is a judicial (not statutory) construct, and therefore 
can be shaped with a relatively free hand by the Delaware courts.  The Chancery Court in 
Siliconix approached the standard of review question by examining the board’s statutory role: 
because the board is the gatekeeper to the statutory merger process but plays no formal role in 
tender offers, the court carved out tender offers as an exception to the traditional entire fairness 
review for self-dealing transactions.  However, as several post-Siliconix judges and academic 
commentators have noted (e.g., V.C. Strine in In re Pure Resources; Gilson & Gordon 2003), 
this reasoning runs counter to a long line of Delaware case law that is precisely about the 
appropriate role for the target board in hostile tender offers.  In order to avoid this considerable 
tension (if not contradiction) between the board’s role in third-party tender offers and the board’s 
role in freeze-out tender offers, the better approach would be a return to first principles of 
Delaware corporate law, under which the objective in a self-interested transaction is to emulate, 
to the extent possible, the process and outcome of an arms-length negotiation.  Applying this 
general principle to the freeze-out context, courts should assess the extent to which the 
negotiation process emulates both prongs of the arms-length merger process, namely, 
disinterested board approval and disinterested shareholder approval.  The more the process 
provides both of these procedural safeguards, the more likely a court should be to apply business 
judgment review; conversely, the more the process does not include these procedural safeguards, 
the more likely a court should be to apply entire fairness review. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that current freeze-out doctrine falls short of 
this arms-length standard in two important respects.  First, because SC’s do not have bargaining 
power in tender offer freeze-outs, SC approval in tender offers does not adequately emulate 
target board approval in a third-party context, in which both parties have veto power.  Second, 
because current doctrine provides no incentive for the controller to provide a MOM condition in 
a merger freeze-out after the controller has received SC approval, almost two-thirds of one-step 
merger freeze-outs do not provide this protection.  Putting these points together, the theory and 
evidence presented in this paper suggest that current doctrine falls short with respect to the first 
element of the arms-length merger process (i.e., disinterested board approval) with respect to 
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shareholder approval) with respect to the freeze-out mergers.  
The objective, then, is to construct a more tailored application of business judgment review 
(BJR) and entire fairness review (EFR) that is sensitive to specific procedural choices that the 
controller and the SC make, rather than simply applying BJR for tender offers and EFR for 
merger freeze-outs.  Specifically, when a deal process includes meaningful SC bargaining power 
against the controller and minority shareholder approval, courts should apply BJR; when either 
or both of these process prongs are weak or non-existent, courts should apply EFR.  If properly 
constructed, the system of standards of review would create incentives for controllers to provide 
adequate procedural protections to the minority, regardless of the transactional form used.  By 
extension, a properly constructed system of review would achieve convergence in process and 
outcomes between freeze-out mergers and freeze-out tender offers. 
An additional objective for doctrinal reform, not implied by the results presented here but 
generally well-accepted among practitioners and academics, is that EFR should be deployed 
sparingly, given the cost and difficulty of its application.   In fact, part of the explanation for the 
dramatic doctrinal gap between Kahn v. Lynch (in which the Delaware Supreme Court 
maintained EFR for freeze-out mergers) and Siliconix (in which the Chancery Court abandoned 
EFR for freeze-out tender offers) may be the fact that Chancery judges “personally face the 
daunting task of valuation” and therefore may be “institutionally inclined to avoid it wherever 
they can do so responsibly” (Allen & Kraakman 2003:312).  This aspect of judicial realism 
suggests that the simple solution of applying EFR to all freeze-out transactions, as proposed by 
Cannon (2003) and Resnick (2003), may not adequately account for institutional realities and 
may introduce judicial costs that outweigh the benefits of doctrinal convergence. 
Considering these objectives together, and drawing from proposals put forward by Gilson & 
Gordon (2003), Allen, Jacobs & Strine (2001), and Wolfe (2002), I summarize my proposal for 
reform in Figure 4. 
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Beginning with the upper branch of the tree, the proposed approach, following Gilson & 
Gordon (2003), applies BJR for freeze-out tender offers in which the controller receives SC 
approval and sufficient minority approval in the form of tendered shares.  This proposal is 
consistent with Chancery Court’s holding in Siliconix, but for a different reason: while the 
Chancery Court applied BJR because of the absence of a statutory role for the board in a tender 
offer, the proposed approach applies BJR because the transaction received both SC approval and 
(through shares tendered) minority shareholder approval.  This difference in reasoning yields 
important differences around the edges of the preferred route: if the target has independent 
directors but does not form an SC, or if an SC is formed and recommends against the deal, the 
Siliconix  approach continues to yield BJR in a tender offer freeze-out, while the proposed 
approach yields EFR because the board approval condition is not satisfied.  Note that this 
difference around the edges of the preferred route creates incentives for the target to establish a 
SC and for the controller to gain SC approval, which in turn give the SC bargaining power 
against the controller. 
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from Gilson & Gordon, I propose BJR if the SC recommends against the transaction but the 
controller nevertheless is able to gain supermajority support among the minority shareholders.  
This point follows from the theoretical model and empirical evidence presented in this paper 
suggesting that minority shareholder approval can be an important built-in (structural) constraint 
against the controller in a tender offer freeze-out.  This contour limits the SC’s ability to 
unreasonably withhold approval against a price that appeals to a supermajority of minority 
shareholders.  Indirectly, this contour gives greater bargaining power to the SC against a large 
controller compared to a smaller controller, precisely where the theory and empirical evidence 
presented in this paper indicate that bargaining power is needed.  The reason is that a large 
controller does not need supermajority approval from the minority; therefore, under the proposed 
approach, the only way a large controller can achieve BJR is through SC approval. 
Examining the bottom half of the tree, the general principle remains the same: when the 
controller receives both disinterested board approval (i.e., SC approval) and disinterested 
shareholder approval (MOM approval), the court should apply BJR; when either or both of these 
procedural protections are lacking, the court should apply EFR.  The proposed approach is 
consistent with Allen, Jacobs & Strine (2001), which advocates BJR for freeze-outs that include 
a MOM condition, and with Wolfe (2002), which provides theoretical reasons for valuing a 
MOM condition in a merger freeze-out but not in a tender offer freeze-out.  In the case where 
there are no independent directors,
48 the proposed approach advocates EFR review even with a 
MOM condition, on the grounds that majority support from the minority does not substitute for 
judicial review of the transaction, though in most deals support from a majority of the minority 
would provide important evidence on the question of entire fairness.  Importantly, this proposed 
approach does not require a reconsideration of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Kahn 
v. Lynch.  The Kahn rule – that SC approval or MOM approval leads to burden shifting on entire 
fairness – continues to stand; the additional layer provided here is that the combination of SC 
approval and MOM approval leads to BJR.   
                                                 
48 Because the director independence requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the stock exchange listing 




Recent changes in the judicial protection afforded minority shareholders under the Delaware 
common law have attracted considerable practitioner and academic commentary over the past 
three years.  This paper presents the first systematic empirical evidence on the influence of these 
doctrinal movements on freeze-out form and outcomes.  On outcomes, I find that controlling 
shareholders are able to pay less in tender offer freeze-outs than in merger freeze-outs.  This 
difference is statistically and economically meaningful, and is consistent with New York City 
practitioner views that controlling shareholders have more bargaining power against special 
committees in tender offer freeze-outs than in merger freeze-outs.  On transactional form, I 
present some evidence that larger controllers are more likely to proceed via tender offer when its 
outside counsel has substantial M&A experience.   
These findings provide new insights on transactional practice and on freeze-out policy.  On 
legal practice, the evidence presented here is consistent with the view that new transaction 
structuring practices disseminate slowly among corporate law firms.  In addition, the evidence on 
deal outcomes suggests that this slow dissemination can sometimes have negative economic 
consequences for clients, who leave legal issues such as choice of transactional form to their 
outside counsel.  These findings also bolster arguments for convergence in judicial standards of 
review between tender offer and merger freeze-outs, and provide guidance on how such 
convergence might best be achieved. 
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressTable 1: Summary Statistics by Transaction Form 
This table reports summary statistics on all freeze-out transactions announced between June 19, 2001, when the 
Delaware Chancery Court issued its opinion in Siliconix, and December 31, 2003 (n=96).  Two reverse stock splits 
are categorized as statutory mergers for reasons described in the text.  * = statistically significant difference between 
means at 90% confidence; ** = statistically significant at 95% confidence; *** = statistically significant at 99% 
confidence. 
 
Mean (median)  All Transactions 
(n=96) 




     
Target characteristics      
Delaware incorporation  60.4%  74.1%  55.1% 
      
Controlling shareholder       
Controller pre-announcement stake  64.7% (65.4%)  70.8% (73.1%)  62.4% (63.09%) 
Founder or family group  45.8%  25.9%**  53.6%** 
Private equity firm  6.3%  3.7%  7.2% 
Corporate parent  47.9%  70.4%**  39.1%** 
Experienced outside counsel  26.7%  50.0%**  16.7%** 
      
Deal characteristics      
Transaction value ($MM)  96.0 (14.5)  194.4 (25.5)**  57.6 (11.5)** 
Stock consideration  16.7%  18.5%  15.9% 
      
Offer conditions      
Non-waivable majority-of-the-minority 
or 90% tender condition 
61.8% 88.9%***  45.1%*** 
Back-end guarantee at same price    96.3%  N/a 
      
Outcomes      
Tendered into front-end tender offer (%)    73.7% (78.0%)  N/a 
Success rate  79.2%  92.6%  73.9% 
Days between initiation and close  161 (143)  100 (100)***  194 (185)*** 
      
Bargaining power (successful deals 
only) 
    
Increase over first offer   14.3% (10.4%)  7.2% (4.2%)***  18.1% (11.6%)*** 
Final premium over pre-announcement 
trading price: 
    
   1 day prior  45.0% (34.4)  33.8% (26.3%)*  51.0% (35.9%)* 
   1 week prior  43.8% (32.6)  28.8% (27.5%)**  51.6% (37.9%)** 
   4 weeks prior  44.4% (39.6)  25.1% (31.1%)***  54.7% (47.8%)*** 
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art17 Table 2A-2D: Negotiated Outcomes by Minority Approval Required, Transactional Form 
 
This table reports the outcomes by the minority approval required and the transactional form used.  Tender offer 
freeze-outs are defined to require “high” approval when the controlling shareholder holds a below-median pre-deal 
stake in the target.  The median pre-deal stake in the sample of successful tender offer freeze-outs (n=25) is 73.0%. 
Statutory merger freeze-outs are defined to require “high” approval when the deal includes a majority-of-the-
minority (MOM) condition or a 90% condition. * = statistically significant difference between means at 90% 
confidence; ** = statistically significant at 95% confidence; *** = statistically significant at 99% confidence. 
 
Table 2A: Increases Over First Offer 
 









































Table 2B: Premium Paid Over Market Price 1 Day Prior to Deal Announcement 
 














































Table 2C: Premium Paid Over Market Price 1 Week Prior to Deal Announcement 
 










































Table 2D: Premium Paid Over Market Price 4 Weeks Prior to Deal Announcement 
 








































http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art17Table 3: Negotiated Outcomes – Multivariate Analysis 
 
This table reports regression estimates on the association between the outcome for minority shareholders and target, 
controller, and deal characteristics.  * = statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = statistically significant at 
95% confidence; *** = statistically significant at 99% confidence.  All models are run as ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions and include a constant term (not reported).  Standard errors are White (1980) robust. 
 
Table 3A: All successful deals 
 
Dependent variable Î #1:  Increase 
over first offer 
#2: Premium over 
market price 1 day 
prior 
#3: Premium over 
market price 1 week 
prior 
#4: Premium over 
market price 4 weeks 
prior 
       
Target Characteristics       
Delaware incorporation  5.37 (3.23)  1.68 (9.65)  4.28 (9.54)  -2.25 (9.83) 
       
Controlling Shareholder       
Private equity firm?  -15.40 (3.68)***  66.39 (29.51)**  74.74 (27.45)***  61.95 (28.64)** 
Corporate parent?  0.01 (4.31)  9.78 (10.69)  6.05 (10.46)  6.44 (10.90) 
       
Deal Characteristics       
Tender offer  -10.41 (4.52)**  -23.03 (12.07)*  -27.35 (11.93)**  -35.57 (11.99)*** 
Minority approval required (%)  -0.01 (0.09)  0.26 (0.19)  0.21 (0.19)  0.24 (0.19) 
Log(transaction value)  -1.74 (1.39)  -4.26 (3.00)  -2.55 (3.68)  -1.51 (3.98) 
Stock consideration?  11.23 (9.70)  -1.96 (16.11)  -3.32 (16.26)  -10.00 (17.40) 
       
Number of observations  69  69 67 69 
R-sq  21.5%  22.6% 26.3% 23.7% 
 
Table 3B: Delaware targets only 
 
Dependent variable Î #1:  Increase 
over first offer 
#2: Premium over 
market price 1 day 
prior 
#3: Premium over 
market price 1 week 
prior 
#4: Premium over 
market price 4 weeks 
prior 
       
Controlling Shareholder       
Private equity firm?  -16.74 (6.40)**  42.07 (31.44)  60.00 (31.76)*  53.18 (30.22)* 
Corporate parent?  3.49 (8.82)  18.10 (18.36)  20.41 (18.89)  27.87 (19.63) 
       
Deal Characteristics       
Tender offer  -9.10 (7.51)  -20.39 (15.02)  -33.16 (15.21)**  -50.11 (15.62)*** 
Minority approval required (%)  -0.05 (0.12)  -0.03 (0.24)  -0.12 (0.25)  -0.12 (0.25) 
Log(transaction value)  -2.66 (2.02)  -4.98 (5.18)  -3.78 (4.82)  -0.46 (4.63) 
Stock consideration?  11.06 (9.95)  -5.22 (18.43)  -7.71 (16.70)  -21.54 (17.29) 
       
Number of observations  44  42 40 42 
R-sq  22.0%  18.5% 33.1% 32.5% 
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressTable 4: Negotiated Outcomes – Tender Offer/Control Interaction  
 
This table reports regression estimates on the association between the outcome for minority shareholders and target, 
controller, and deal characteristics.  * = statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = statistically significant at 
95% confidence; *** = statistically significant at 99% confidence.  All models are run as ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions and include a constant term (not reported).  Standard errors are White (1980) robust. 
 
Table 4A: All successful deals 
 
Dependent variable Î #1:  Increase 
over first offer 
#2: Premium over 
market price 1 day 
prior 
#3: Premium over 
market price 1 week 
prior 
#4: Premium over 
market price 4 weeks 
prior 
       
Target Characteristics       
Delaware incorporation  5.69 (3.21)*  2.58 (9.78)  5.33 (9.77)  -1.22 (10.05) 
       
Controlling Shareholder       
Private equity firm?  -14.93 (4.01)***  66.99 (28.82)**  74.67 (27.30)***  62.14 (27.92)** 
Corporate parent?  0.13 (4.20)  9.54 (10.69)  5.21 (10.65)  4.83 (10.84) 
       
Deal Characteristics       
Tender offer*Control  -0.29 (0.09)***  -0.58 (0.31)*  -0.58 (0.29)*  -0.79 (0.30)*** 
Minority approval required (%)  -0.03 (0.08)  0.21 (0.17)  0.13 (0.17)  0.13 (0.17) 
Log(transaction value)  -1.68 (1.37)  -4.18 (3.01)  -2.63 (3.70)  -1.40 (3.98) 
Stock consideration?  11.32 (9.52)  -1.77 (15.84)  -3.06 (16.05)  -9.29 (17.23) 
       
Number of observations  69  69 67 69 
R-sq  23.8%  23.7% 25.5% 23.2% 
 
Table 4B: Delaware targets only 
 
Dependent variable Î #1:  Increase 
over first offer 
#2: Premium over 
market price 1 day 
prior 
#3: Premium over 
market price 1 week 
prior 
#4: Premium over 
market price 4 weeks 
prior 
       
Controlling Shareholder       
Private equity firm?  -15.69 (6.63)**  45.37 (28.66)  59.12 (30.65)*  52.00 (27.66)* 
Corporate parent?  4.47 (8.39)  22.03 (18.34)  21.13 (18.52)  26.57 (18.39) 
       
Deal Characteristics       
Tender offer*Control  -0.29 (0.15)*  -0.69 (0.37)*  -0.75 (0.32)**  -1.15 (0.33)*** 
Minority approval required (%)  -0.07 (0.12)  -0.07 (0.23)  -0.19 (0.24)  -0.26 (0.25) 
Log(transaction value)  -2.44 (2.01)  -4.40 (5.26)  -4.43 (4.76)  -0.69 (4.44) 
Stock consideration?  10.39 (9.60)  -7.74 (18.23)  -7.18 (15.82)  -20.11 (16.45) 
       
Number of observations  44  42 40 42 
R-sq  24.6%  23.1% 33.6% 34.2% 
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This table reports statistics on the percent of freeze-outs executed via tender offer, by the pre-deal controlling stake 
of the acquirer and the M&A experience of the controller’s outside counsel.  “Experienced” outside counsel are the 
fifteen law firms which advised most frequently in M&A transactions, on either the buy-side or the sell-side, during 
the period 1990-2003.  * = statistically significant difference between means at 90% confidence; ** = statistically 
significant at 95% confidence; *** = statistically significant at 99% confidence.  Rows do not sum to total column 
because the identity of the controller’s outside counsel is not publicly reported for unsuccessful statutory merger 
freeze-outs. 
 
Table 5A: Full sample 
 
% executed via 
tender offer 
(number of total 
deals in category) 
M&A experience  








































Table 5B: Delaware targets only 
 
% executed via 
tender offer 
(number of total 
deals in category) 
M&A experience  
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 Table 6: Transaction Form – Multivariate Analysis 
This table reports regression estimates on the association between the controller’s choice of transactional form 
(tender offer or statutory merger) and target, controller, and deal characteristics.  The dependent variable in all 
models is TENDER, set to 1 if the freeze-out is structured as a tender offer and 0 otherwise.  * = statistically 
significant at 90% confidence; ** = statistically significant at 95% confidence; *** = statistically significant at 99% 
confidence.  All models are run as probit regressions and include a constant term (not reported). 
Table 6A: Full sample 
 
Model # Î  #1 #2 #3 #4 
      
Target Characteristics      
Delaware incorporation  0.40 (0.33)  0.12 (0.36)  0.08 (0.36)  0.07 (0.36) 
      
Controller Characteristics      
Private equity firm?  -0.07 (0.73)  -0.47 (0.86)  -0.57 (0.88)  -0.51 (0.88) 
Corporate parent  0.47 (0.36)  0.29 (0.41) 0.34  (0.39) 0.41  (0.39) 
      
Controller’s Outside Counsel:      
Experienced?   0.52  (0.42)     
Experienced? * Control       0.02 (0.01)   
Experienced? * High Control?         1.10 (0.58)* 
      
Deal Characteristics      
Minority approval required in 
tender offer (%) 
-0.03 (0.01)**  -0.03 (0.01)**  -0.02 (0.01)*  -0.02 (0.01) 
Log(transaction value)  0.25 (0.10)**  0.17 (0.11)  0.16 (0.11)  0.14 (0.11) 
Stock consideration?  -1.12 (0.49)**  -0.60 (0.54)  -0.61 (0.54)  -0.57 (0.54) 
      
Log(days since Siliconix)    -0.26 (0.20)  -0.26 (0.20)  -0.23 (0.20) 
      
Number of observations  96 86 86 86 
Pseudo R-sq  21.5% 23.7% 24.7% 25.9% 
 
Table 6B: Delaware targets only 
 
Model # Î  #1 #2 #3 #4 
      
Controller Characteristics      
Private equity firm?  0.54 (0.83)  -0.12 (1.05)  -0.14 (1.05)  0.13 (1.04) 
Corporate parent  0.92 (0.51)*  0.71 (0.61)  0.89 (0.58)  1.16 (0.60) 
      
Controller Outside Counsel:      
Experienced?   0.93  (0.55)*     
Experienced? * Control       0.03 (0.02)*   
Experienced? * High Control?        1.82 (0.88)** 
      
Deal Characteristics      
Minority approval required in 
tender offer (%) 
-0.02 (0.01)  -0.02 (0.02)  -0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02) 
Log(transaction value)  0.44 (0.15)***  0.36 (0.18)**  0.33 (0.18)*  0.32 (0.18)* 
Stock consideration?  -1.57 (0.61)**  -1.07 (0.71)  -1.08 (0.70)  -1.10 (0.72) 
      
Log(days since Siliconix)    -0.33 (0.27)  -0.30 (0.27)  -0.22 (0.27) 
      
Number of observations  58 54 54 54 
Pseudo R-sq  33.6% 42.0% 42.8% 45.5% 
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